There is growing evidence that consumers are influenced by Internet-based opinion forums before making a variety of purchase decisions. Firms whose products are being discussed in such forums are therefore tempted to try to manipulate consumer perceptions by injecting anonymous messages that praise their products or by offering incentives to consumers to do so. This paper offers a theoretical analysis of the impact of such strategic behavior on firm profits and consumer surplus. We examine a setting where two firms simultaneously introduce imperfect substitute experience goods of different qualities and consumers obtain quality information from an online forum. Firms attempt to influence consumer beliefs about their respective quality through costly forum manipulation. The most striking result of our analysis is that strategic manipulation can either decrease or increase the information value of online forums to consumers relative to the case where no manipulation takes place. Specifically, there exist settings where the presence of honest consumer opinions induces firms to reveal their own, more precise, knowledge of product qualities by manipulating at relative intensities that are proportional to their actual qualities.
Introduction
The Internet has enabled individuals all over the world to make their personal experiences, thoughts, and opinions easily accessible to the global community "at the click of a mouse". This, in turn, has led to the creation of a diverse mosaic of online word-of-mouth communities ("online forums") where individuals exchange experiences and opinions on a variety of topics ranging from products and services, to politics and world events.
In the past few years, online forums have been steadily growing in popularity and have become an indispensable component of portals (e.g. Yahoo! Movies), traditional news sites (e.g. BBC Talking Point), consumer report sites (e.g. CNET, Epinions, Citysearch, Moviefone), and online retailer websites (e.g. Amazon, Circuit City). Table 1 lists some common types of online forums in use today.
There is growing evidence that consumers are influenced by online forums before making a variety of purchase decisions (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2003; Senecal and Nantel, 2003; Thompson 2003) . Similar evidence suggests that forums play an increasingly important role in public opinion formation. Online forums are thus emerging as an alternative source of information to mainstream mass media, replacing our societies' traditional reliance on the "wisdom of the specialist" by the "knowledge of the many".
Many have argued that the scalability and decentralized nature of these new information structures can lead to freer, better informed and, ultimately, more efficient markets and societies.
The above argument certainly has merits. From the law of large numbers, the aggregation of sufficiently many observations of "ordinary" consumers or citizens is eventually going to exceed the precision of any single specialist's opinion, however enlightened that may be. Furthermore, the decentralized nature of information exchange makes it difficult for any single stakeholder to directly control and distort the signal that reaches the population of receivers.
• Online review sites. Includes consumer opinions published on the Internet by online merchants, by commercial web sites that specialize in posting consumer opinions, and by consumers who publish their product opinions on their own web sites, including "revenge" sites.
• Mailbags. Includes customer and reader comments and feedback posted on web sites of such organizations as consumer products manufacturers, service providers, magazines, and news organizations.
• Discussion forums. Includes bulletin boards, Usenet groups, and published ongoing discussions on specific topics.
• Listservs. Includes consumer opinions sent by e-mail to the members of an e-mail list.
• Chat rooms. Includes real-time conversations over the Internet between groups of people, often based on a particular topic.
Table 1. Common types of online forums (Adapted from Schindler and Bickart (2003)).
Nevertheless, the same properties (decentralized architecture, relative anonymity of information sources) that make the Internet such a difficult medium to control directly, make it relatively easy for stakeholders to indirectly manipulate the probability distribution of information propagated through online forums by anonymously adding their own strategically biased messages to the total mix of posted opinions.
Online forum manipulation strategies can take many forms, and firms (or, depending on the context of interest, political parties, or interest groups) are getting more sophisticated about them by the day. The simplest firm strategy is to anonymously post online reviews praising its own products, or bad-mouthing those of its competitors. There is ample evidence that such manipulation takes place. For example, when, in February 2004, due to a software error, Amazon.com mistakenly revealed the true identities of some of its book reviewers, it turned out that a sizable proportion of those reviews were written by the books' own publishers, authors, and competitors (Harmon 2004) . The music industry is known to hire professional "posters" who surf various online chat rooms and fan sites in order to post positive opinions on behalf of the new album (White 1999; Mayzlin, 2003) .
Given the potential backlash of such activity, firms are experimenting with more indirect approaches. Some firms offer rewards to consumers who start favorable conversations about their products on popular online forums. For example, singer Lucinda Williams's latest marketing campaign promises prizes to fans that start "conversations" in online forums praising her albums (see slate.msn.com, July 26, 2001 ). Other firms routinely monitor online forums to identify influential community members. They then target them directly and try to persuade them to write favorable reviews by sending them free samples, inviting them to special events, etc.
There is at least one professional marketing firm who conducts such campaigns on behalf of its clients (see www.electricartists.com).
As more firms, political parties and special interest groups realize the power of online forums, it is expected that more will engage in direct or indirect manipulation practices. It is therefore important and timely to understand what the impact of such activity is likely to be on the informativeness of Internet forums and on the payoffs to the various parties that are affected by them. The results of such analyses will be relevant to policy decisions (should Internet forum manipulation be outlawed?), R&D decisions (does it pay to invest in technologies that discourage online manipulation? who should bear the cost of such investments?) and, of course, firm and consumer attitudes towards Internet forums (how much should consumers trust online forums? how much should firms invest in trying to manipulate them? is consumer participation in such forums socially beneficial?). This paper contributes to answering such questions by analyzing how the strategic manipulation of Internet opinion forums affects the payoffs of consumers and firms in a duopoly of vertically differentiated imperfect substitute experience goods. I assume that the qualities of the two competing goods are known to firms but, initially, unknown to consumers. I further assume that the only source of quality information for consumers is an online "product review" forum (such as Epinions.com) where past consumers post opinions about their experiences with the goods.
New consumers read those opinions and form perceptions about the qualities of the competing products. Based on those perceptions, they make purchase decisions. Firms can attempt to manipulate consumer perceptions by injecting fake messages that praise their own product into the forum, at a cost. All firms are assumed to be strategic, that is, they manipulate opinion forums to maximize their payoff, given their correct anticipation of other firms' strategies.
Furthermore, consumers are "smart"; even though they cannot directly distinguish "honest" opinions from "fake" opinions, they are aware that manipulation takes place and adjust their interpretation of online opinions accordingly.
The most striking result of our analysis is that strategic manipulation can either decrease or increase the informativeness of online forums (in the sense of decreasing or increasing the expected ex-ante payoff of consumers who base their decisions on information published in such forums) relative to the case where no manipulation takes place. Specifically, there exist settings where the presence of honest consumer opinions (that can be thought of as imprecise "base signals" of true product qualities) induces firms to reveal their own, more precise, knowledge of product qualities by manipulating at relative intensities that are proportional to their actual qualities (i.e., high quality firms inflate their ratings more than low quality firms). This behavior increases the ability of consumers to infer true qualities from the resulting aggregate ratings.
Outcomes of this type arise in settings where the marginal payoff to a firm from increasing consumers' perceptions of its quality is an increasing function of perceived quality. In contrast, in settings where the marginal payoff to a firm from increasing consumers' perceptions of its quality is a decreasing function of perceived quality, equilibrium firm manipulation intensities are inversely proportional to firms' true qualities (i.e. low quality firms inflate their ratings more than high quality firms). Manipulation activity then decreases the ability of consumers to infer true qualities.
In the duopoly setting that forms the center of our analysis, I show that, in markets where prices are endogenously determined (e.g. markets for consumer electronics, cars, etc.), if manipulation costs do not rise too steeply with actual quality, manipulation activity tends to increase forum informativeness. On the other hands, in markets where prices are exogenously fixed (e.g. markets for CDs, movies, etc.), manipulation activity usually decreases forum informativeness.
The preceding analysis shows that there are practically important cases where the impact of online manipulation on consumers will be positive. However, even in such cases, if a sufficiently large number of honest consumers post their opinions online, I show that the cost of manipulation to firms outweighs its benefits: the impact of the incremental signal precision on firm revenues is lower than the corresponding manipulation costs. Nevertheless, firms have no choice: the high quality firm is forced to spend marketing resources inflating its online reviews to prevent its competitor from catching up with it. The low quality firm must do the same to avoid being considered as even lower quality than it truly is. Online manipulation, thus, becomes an "arms race" that harms the profits of both firms.
To summarize, even though it can sometimes be beneficial to consumers, if the size of the market is large enough, online forum manipulation is always harmful to firms. The result is surprising as it is the opposite of what common sense would have suggested. The paper shows that the social cost of online manipulation can be reduced by developing technologies that increase the unit cost of manipulation and by encouraging higher participation of consumers who post "honest" opinions.
This work relates to a number of different streams of economics literature. In the signal-jamming literature (Holmstrom 1999; Riordan 1985; Fudenberg and Tirole 1986; Mirman, Samuelson and Schlee 1994) players that possess some private information (about their costs, ability, quality, etc.) attempt to influence the direction or degree to which their rivals update their beliefs by distorting prices or outputs relative to myopically optimal levels, sacrificing current profits but affecting the informational content of the market outcome in ways that increase future expected profits. In the quality signaling literature (Kihlstrom and Riordan 1984; Milgrom and Roberts 1986 ) producers of experience goods use costly signals (such as prices or advertising) to communicate their quality to consumers. Judd and Riordan (1994) in particular show that if consumers have some (possibly small amount of) information about a product's quality that firms don't possess, price signaling is possible even in the absence of cost asymmetries or repeat purchases. In a similar manner, our analysis shows that the presence of honest but noisy consumer ratings, whose exact value is unknown to firms at the time when they decide on manipulation strategies, can sometimes induce firms to act in ways that signal their private information about their relative qualities to consumers. In such settings, online manipulation becomes an alternative form of quality signaling, similar to dissipative advertising. Mayzlin (2003) offers a theoretical model of promotional chat in Usenet groups where consumers discuss products and services. Each consumer is exposed to a random subset of messages (in Mayzlin's model, a single message) posted in those groups. Firms masquerade as consumers and inject promotional messages in order to influence consumer opinions and thus increase their sales. Mayzlin's basic result is that, if the ratio of profits to manipulation cost is high enough, there exists an informative equilibrium in which both firms manipulate, the low quality firm manipulates more, but overall, online chat remains somewhat informative: consumers would still be correct to follow the advice of the single random message they are exposed to, even though the probability of making a wrong choice is higher than if there was no promotional chat. Promotional chat thus decreases the informativeness of online forums. Our work generalizes Mayzlin's result, shows that there exist settings where manipulation can increase forum informativeness, identifies general conditions under which manipulation increases or decreases informativeness, and considers the impact of manipulation cost and degree of consumer participation on forum informativeness and firm profits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 identifies general conditions under which strategic forum manipulation increases or decreases a forum's information value to consumers. Sections 4 and 5 derive equilibrium strategies and comparative statics in settings where prices are endogenously and exogenously set respectively. Section 6 discusses the strategic implications of our findings for consumers, firms, and forum operators.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
The setting
Two competing firms, A and B (denoted by the subscript j, j=A,B) simultaneously introduce imperfect substitute durable products (automobiles, digital cameras, laptops, etc.) The appeal of each product to consumers is the sum of two independent components: a "type" component, representing product characteristics whose valuation depends on each individual consumer's taste (color, shape, look-and-feel, etc.) , and a "quality" component, representing characteristics whose valuation is identical among all consumers (ease of use, durability, etc.) A product's "type" can be reliably communicated to consumers, whereas a product's true "quality" can only become known after the good is bought and consumed.
The two products are assumed to be located at the [0, 1] taste interval. Product A is located at 0 and product B is located at 1. Qualities Each period, N consumers enter the market and stay there for just one period. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the unit "taste interval" and face linear transportation costs. Consumers have unit demand. A consumer's utility from consuming products A, B is given by:
is the consumer's location on the taste interval. 
Expected utility maximization and price-taking behavior given prices
imply the following linear demand functions
2 1 θ I assume that the only source of consumer information regarding product qualities is an online forum (such as Epinions.com) where past consumers post anonymous reviews. At the beginning of each period the forum publishes the arithmetic mean of all consumer ratings posted for that firm during all past periods.
Throughout this paper I will consider a two-period version of the game. To highlight the effect of online ratings on consumer learning I also will assume that prices do not play a signaling role 3 Given that qualities are drawn from a continuous type space with full support, in a separating equilibrium all possible prices would in principle be observable. In the absence of cost asymmetries between firms, no separating equilibrium where prices alone perfectly signal quality is sustainable. If one assumes that prices only carry imperfect information about quality (for example, because firms themselves possess imperfect information about their qualities) then it is possible to construct separating equilibria where both prices and online ratings affect consumer learning (see Judd and Riordan (1994) and Caminal and Vives (1996) for examples of linear-normal models where prices carry imperfect quality information). In such equilibria the strategic considerations affecting online rating manipulation are qualitatively identical to those in models where prices do not signal quality. Since the focus of this paper is not the signaling of quality through price, to clarify the exposition we therefore assume that prices do not play a signaling role. 4 The multi-period nature of the interaction introduces an interesting possibility of strategic pricing in period 0: since the number of customers today affects the number (and thus the aggregate precision) of consumer ratings tomorrow, firms might be tempted to deviate from myopically optimal price levels to influence future consumer learning in ways that maximize the present value of their payoffs. Vettas (1997) studies this problem in a setting where firms strategically control each period's quantities. In our setting, future consumers have access to the average ratings of all past consumers. The larger the number of those ratings, the higher the precision of their arithmetic mean and the lower the impact of deviations of that precision on posterior beliefs (to see this, consider a setting where consumers update a normal prior with mean m and precision τ by observing a normal signal z with precision ρ . The posterior mean is then equal to
. The derivative of the posterior mean with respect to ρ goes to zero as ρ goes to infinity). Given that any deviation from myopically optimal prices entails current revenue losses, if the size of the market (and therefore the number of ratings submitted each period) is large enough, then the strategic incentive to engage in such deviations becomes miniscule. For that reason, I am omitting such strategic pricing considerations from the model. . The forum cannot distinguish between genuine ratings and fake ratings, and thus includes all ratings in the published averages. We assume that the effect of manipulation is to inflate the mean of the probability distribution of a firm's published ratings from j q to j j q η + . In Appendix B we argue that, if the cost of manipulation is proportional to the number of fake messages, then it is (i) proportional to the number of honest ratings Nr , (ii) a convex function of the amount j η by which a firm wishes to inflate its published average ratings, and (iii) an increasing function of a firm's true quality j q (it is more difficult to inflate already good ratings). To retain mathematical tractability, we assume a quadratic cost form
In period 1, consumers view the published ratings B A y y , and update their prior beliefs about the quality difference of the two firms. Firms view the same information and set prices. Finally, consumers observe prices and make purchasing decisions.
The fundamental question that this paper addresses is whether forum manipulation activity will increase or decrease firms profits and consumer surplus in period 1 relative to the case where no manipulation took place.
Two General Results
This section presents two general theorems related to the informativeness of online forums in the setting of Section 2. The theorems capture the most general intuitions behind the results of Sections 4 and 5.
In the absence of manipulation, average consumer ratings published by an online forum can be thought of as random variables drawn from an information structure ) | ( q y f . Online manipulation shifts the probability distribution of online ratings to )) (
According to the standard definition, information structure g is more informative than f if and only if a family of decision makers is better off (in terms of their ex-ante expected payoff) basing their decisions on signals drawn from g than from signals drawn from f.
It is well known since Blackwell (1951) that the comparison of information structures in arbitrary decision problems is often not possible. More meaningful results can be obtained if one restricts the set of decision problems and information structures of interest. Lehmann (1988) studies decision problems in which the payoff function has a single-crossing property and posterior beliefs have the monotone likelihood ratio property and derives elegant informativeness ordering conditions for that class of problems. Building on Lehmann's conditions, we derive the following result:
Theorem 1: If the distribution of average ratings in the setting of Section 2 belongs to a location family that has the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) then:
1. Online manipulation increases the value of online forums to consumers if the amount of manipulation j η is a monotonically increasing function of each firm's quality difference relative to its competitor.
2. Online manipulation decreases the value of online forums to consumers if the amount of manipulation j η is a monotonically decreasing function of each firm's quality difference relative to its competitor.
3. In both case the increase (decrease) in information value is proportional to the magnitude of the rate of change of j η with respect to the quality difference of the two firms.
According to the above result, manipulation activity increases forum informativeness if the high (low) quality firm's manipulation intensity increases (decreases) with Our next result connects the informativeness criterion of Theorem 1 to properties of firms' payoff functions. This connection allows us to understand in what settings we can expect online forum manipulation to benefit or harm consumers.
Theorem 2: In the setting of Section 2, there exist equilibria where a firm's manipulation intensity j η is an increasing (decreasing) function of that firm's quality difference q relative to its competitor if and only if the firm's expected payoff function (inclusive of the cost of manipulation) satisfies the single crossing property in
If a firm's payoff function is differentiable, a sufficient condition for Theorem 2 to hold is that the cross-derivative of the payoff function with respect to j η and q is always positive (negative).
Intuitively, if the marginal benefits to manipulation are an increasing (decreasing) function of the quality difference between a firm and its competitor, then there exist equilibria where that firm's manipulation strategy is an increasing (decreasing) function of the quality difference.
Armed with these two results, in the following sections we will analyze the impact of online manipulation in two more specific settings: a setting where prices are endogenous and a setting where prices are exogenously given. The analysis shows that the impact of online manipulation can be qualitatively different in different types of markets.
Endogenous Prices
This section analyzes a duopoly setting where prices are endogenously determined. I show that, if the marginal cost of manipulation does not grow too steeply with a firm's true quality, then there exist separating equilibria in linear strategies in which forum manipulation always increases the informativeness of the forum ratings.
Consider the setting of Section 2. Let θ be the average consumer belief about the quality difference of firms A and B at the beginning of period 1. If prices do not signal quality, then, at equilibrium, maximization of expected sales revenues implies that:
a. prices will be equal to:
b. sales revenues will be equal to:
The notion of equilibrium I use is perfect Bayesian. That is, players maximize their expected payoffs at any point in time given the beliefs they have, and beliefs are consistent in the Bayesian sense with strategies. Beliefs are obtained from equilibrium strategies and observations using Bayes' rule. The analysis of this game is considerably simplified by the fact that, due to Gaussian noise, all feasible signals are observable with positive probability. There are, thus, no out-ofequilibrium paths and no need to consider equilibrium refinements.
The analysis assumes that consumers are aware that the firms may be attempting to manipulate online ratings (although they cannot directly observe the exact amounts of manipulation).
Specifically, consumers understand that published ratings are the sum of three (indistinguishable) components:
where j q are true qualities, ) , (
is the amount by which each firm inflates its ratings and j ε are normally distributed error terms with mean zero and precision Nr = ρ .
Suppose, further, that consumers in period 1 believe that the amount by which each firm inflates its online quality ratings at the end of period 0 is a linear function of the quality differential q : 
in other words, the publicly observable statistic
is a normally distributed unbiased estimator of q with precision
. If consumers update their beliefs using Bayes rule, given the normality of prior beliefs and all observable signals, standard theory (DeGroot, 1970) predicts that each consumer's posterior beliefs about q will be normally distributed with mean:
, according to Theorem 1, the effect of feedback manipulation on the informativeness of online ratings for consumers depends on the sign and magnitude of h . • If 0 = h then both firms inflate their ratings by the same constant amount g ; the informativeness of online feedback regarding the quality differential is unaffected by manipulation.
• If 0 ≥ h then the high quality firm inflates its ratings more than the low quality firm. Given that the high quality firm already enjoys a lead in "honest" opinions, manipulation
accentuates that lead and helps consumers more clearly differentiate between the two competitors. This is a case in which feedback manipulation increases the informativeness of feedback forums.
• If 0 5 . 0 < < − h then the low quality firm inflates its ratings more than the high quality firm and therefore decreases the "distance" between the two firms' expected aggregate ratings.
The high quality firm still ends up with higher expected ratings; however, because published ratings are now closer together, the relative effect of noise is higher. This weakens the ability of consumers to infer the quality difference of the two competitors. In such cases feedback manipulation decreases the informativeness of online forums.
• If
then the low quality firm manages to close the gap between itself and its high quality competitor; the two firms become indistinguishable in terms of their average ratings
. Such behavior completely destroys the informativeness of online forums.
• If 5 . 0 − < h then the low quality firm inflates its ratings substantially more than the high quality firm so that the average ratings of the low quality firm exceed those of the high quality firm. If consumers expect such behavior, this becomes a form of reverse signaling;
consumers understand that the firm with lower ratings is in fact the high quality firm and use equation (1) to estimate the true quality differential 7 .
The following theorem shows that the equilibrium value of h depends on how steeply the cost of manipulation grows with a firm's true quality. functions of each firm's perceived quality difference relative to its competitor. In the absence of manipulation, feedback posted by honest consumers ensures that the expected quality difference perceptions will be positive for the high quality firm and negative for the low quality firm. The expected marginal benefit of increasing consumer perceptions about a firm's quality (through forum manipulation) is, thus, a linear function of consumers' baseline perceptions about the quality difference, and therefore, higher for the high quality firm. The high quality firm thus, receives a higher marginal benefit (in terms of incremental revenues) from inflating its ratings than the low quality firm. On the other hand, the marginal cost of manipulation is proportional to each firm's quality multiplied by µ and, therefore, higher for the high quality firm. If µ is sufficiently small then the overall marginal benfit of manipulation on profits will be higher for the high quality firm. In such settings the high quality firm will manipulate more intensely than the low quality firm, accentuating its lead in online ratings and helping consumers more clearly differentiate between itself and its competitor.
Note that the presence of a "base signal" that corresponds to the arithmetic mean of honest (but noisy) consumer ratings is crucial to the result. It is the presence of this base signal that induces the two firms to reveal their own precise quality information by inflating their ratings by relative amounts that are exactly proportional to their quality difference. The more intensely firms manipulate, the more their perfectly informative signals will crowd out the noisy signal obtained through honest consumer opinions and thus increase forum informativeness. The threshold µ below which manipulation increases forum informativeness is a monotonically increasing function of the precision 2 / Nr = ρ of the base signal. The higher the precision of the base signal, the broader the range of parameters µ for which firms are induced to reveal their private information. , then h and, thus, forum informativeness also decline.
As expected, by making it costlier to manipulate online forums (for example, by introducing technologies that make it more difficult to create multiple identities or to send large amounts of feedback from the same computer), forum operators can reduce the degree to which such activity takes place. The interesting side-effect is that in settings where manipulation increases informativeness, lower manipulation levels decrease the value of the forum to consumers.
An interesting relationship also exists between manipulation and the fraction of consumers who contribute honest online opinions to the forum. An increase in the fraction r of consumers who contribute opinions increases the cost of forum manipulation because the number of "fake" messages that are required in order to inflate a firm's average rating by a given amount is proportional to the number of honest feedback messages (see Appendix B). Thus, one expects that, at equilibrium, higher amounts of honest feedback contribution by consumers will result in lower levels of forum manipulation by firms. This intuition is confirmed by the following theorem. . As r grows, the base precision of the forum signal grows but the incremental precision due to manipulation declines. The following theorem shows that the combined effect is positive, that is, on the balance increased consumer participation increases the value of the forum. The intuition behind Theorem 7 is based on the fact that, if a sufficiently large number of honest consumers post ratings, honest ratings already have sufficient precision to accurately signal quality. Therefore, the incremental signal precision due to manipulation has a small effect on posterior beliefs. The revenue gains obtained through manipulation are thus not enough to justify the manipulation cost. Nevertheless, firms have no choice: the high quality firm is forced to spend marketing resources inflating its online reviews to prevent its competitor from catching up with it. The low quality firm must do the same to avoid being considered as even lower quality than it truly is. Online manipulation, thus, becomes an "arms race" that harms the profits of both firms. Both firms are then better off if high unit costs of manipulation or high levels of consumer participation induce them to keep such activities at low levels.
A final observation is that the comparative statics results of Theorems 4-7 require that the size of the market N be sufficiently high to ensure that the precision of the baseline forum signal is at least as high as that of the prior. In practical terms this requires that the forum aggregates enough consumer opinions before publishing or updating any aggregate ratings. Most forums today immediately publish and/or update all new opinions and ratings as they get posted. An interesting direction for further research is whether such forum practices can lead to social learning anomalies such as herding and informational cascades (Banerjee 1992; Bhikchandani et al. 1992 ).
Exogenous prices
This section analyzes a variation of the previous model in which prices are exogenously fixed. In such a setting firms compete for market share. Specifically, let θ be the average consumer belief about the quality difference of firms A and B at the beginning of period 1 and let
. The analysis of Section 2 then implies that:
a. demand will be equal to:
. sales revenues will be equal to:
The marginal benefit from increasing consumer perceptions about a firm's quality is now independent of the firm's true quality. If the cost of manipulation grows with firm quality, high quality firms have a lower marginal benefit from manipulation and are, thus, expected to manipulate less intensely than low quality firms. This intuition is confirmed by the following theorem:
then there exist perfect Bayesian equilibria in linear strategies in which firm manipulation strategies are given by:
. Therefore, manipulation activity reduces the informativeness of the forum. As µ tends to 2, h tends to -1/2 and the precision of the forum signal tends to zero. This means that, in settings with exogenously fixed prices, firm manipulation activity can severely reduce or even destroy the value of an online forum to consumers. This result has practical importance because a lot of popular forums (e.g. for music, movies, etc.) are associated with markets where prices are essentially fixed. The result is consistent with similar findings by Mayzlin (2003) .
Note that h is independent of the unit cost λ and the ratio of consumer participation r. This means that, as λ grows, forum informativeness (and, thus, consumer surplus) remains unchanged, whereas, as r grows, forum informativeness grows. Increases in consumer participation are thus more beneficial to consumers than the development of technologies that make it more difficult for firms to manipulate.
Since h is independent of λ and r, everything else being equal, firms would prefer to spend fewer resources on manipulation. In common with the case of endogenous prices we find that, as λ and r grow, manipulation intensities decline and firm profits grow. 
Strategic Implications
The preceding analysis paints an intriguing picture of the new competitive environment that is likely to emerge from the continued growth of online opinion forums. 
Consumers.
A striking result of this work is that, even though in many cases strategic forum manipulation activity will decrease the informativeness of online forums, there exist important settings where strategic manipulation will increase the information value of those forums to consumers. Such settings are characterized by seller payoff functions where the marginal benefit of manipulation grows with seller quality. This is more likely to occur in settings where sales revenues are convex functions of sellers' perceived qualities. The presence of a noisy baseline signal of honest consumer ratings then induces firms to reveal their precise knowledge of their qualities by manipulating in relative amounts that are exactly proportional to their quality difference.
Endogenous prices, small positive µ
Model parameter change

Impact on consumer surplus
Impact on manipulation intensity
Impact on firm profits
Higher unit cost of manipulation Another important result is that higher levels of honest consumer participation increase the value of an online forum to all parties involved. By contributing more online opinions, consumers both increase the expected information value of the forum to future consumers, as well as help reduce "wasteful" firm manipulation activity. Avery, Resnick and Zeckhauser (1999) note that online opinions constitute a public good and are, thus, expected to be undersupplied. Concrete incentives might therefore be needed to increase honest consumer participation in online forums. Since higher participation increases firm profits throughout an industry, firms can use part of the money gained to fund consumer compensation initiatives that provide incentives for participation. The results of this paper thus establish a novel argument for increasing consumer online contributions as well as for compensating online contributors, different from that discussed by Avery, Resnick and Zeckhauser (1999) .
Producers
At first glance, online forums ought to benefit firms that offer high quality products in their respective industries, since they help customers more clearly perceive the superior quality of such firms. Strategic forum manipulation, however, complicates the picture. Our model predicts that the ability to manipulate online forums will induce all competing firms to invest in costly "online PR" initiatives that aim to increase the amount of positive "buzz" that they get online.
Furthermore, if the number of honest consumers who post opinions online is sufficiently large, the incremental impact of such initiatives on consumer perceptions will be worth less than their cost. Nevertheless, high quality firms will be forced to engage in forum manipulation to prevent their competitors from catching up with them, whereas low quality firms will manipulate to avoid being perceived as even lower quality than they are. Online manipulation, thus, becomes a costly "arms race" that harms the profits of all firms. The lower the unit cost of manipulation, the higher the levels of this wasteful activity and the lower the resulting firm profits.
Our analysis shows that firms would benefit it they could manipulate less. It further shows that the introduction of mechanisms that make forum manipulation more costly or that encourage higher consumer participation in online forums leads to lower manipulation intensities and higher profits for all firms 8 . Firms should, therefore, support technological initiatives that make forum manipulation more difficult and encourage their customers to contribute opinions to established forums 9 .
Forum Operators.
Online forums operators acquire a pivotal role in this new competitive environment. The preceding analysis shows that the architecture of online forums has important implications for firm profits and consumer surplus. By investing in technologies that increase the difficulty of forum manipulation, operators can help reduce the manipulation expenditures of all competing firms in their industry. Even more importantly, by introducing mechanisms that encourage higher consumer participation, operators can both increase the information value of forums to consumers and decrease firm expenditures. The results of this paper provide a quantitative estimate of the business value of such investments as well as hints as to who should bear their cost (firms are the primary beneficiaries from increases in the cost of manipulation, both future consumers and firms benefit from increased consumer participation).
Concluding Remarks
This paper offers an initial exploration of the issues surrounding the strategic manipulation of online opinion forums by firms whose products are being discussed in them. The principal results can be summarized as follows:
1. Strategic manipulation of online forums can either increase or decrease the information value of a forum to consumers. The likelihood that manipulation increases forum informativeness is higher in settings where the marginal profit gains to firms from increases in consumer perceptions about their quality are increasing functions of perceived quality.
2. If the number of consumers who post honest opinions is large enough, online forum manipulation is harmful to firms because its cost outweighs its benefits. Nevertheless, competing firms are locked into an "arms race" and forced to expend marketing resources on such activity to prevent each other from distorting consumer perceptions about their relative qualities.
3. The cost of manipulation to firms can be reduced by developing technologies that make it more difficult to manipulate. Such technologies, however, do not necessarily increase the value of the forum to consumers.
4. The most effective way to increase the value of a forum to all parties involved is the encouragement of higher participation by honest consumers.
Although the focus of this paper was a duopoly of firms producing experience goods, the results of the paper qualitatively apply in broader settings. Specifically, the increasing importance of online forums in public opinion formation raises similar questions related to manipulation of online discussions by special interest groups or political parties.
This paper has only scratched the surface of an important and complex topic. There are several promising directions for future research.
The current model assumes that the only source of quality information is the online forum. In actual practice firms are using a variety of quality signals. It would be interesting to study how the emergence of online forums affects the use of more traditional quality signals, such as prices and advertising. Another interesting model variation, that perhaps more realistically captures the current reality, is the study of settings where there are two categories of consumers: informed consumers who have access to online forums and uninformed consumers who don't.
Our model assumes that all consumers visit a single centralized online forum and thus access (and contribute to) the same history of quality ratings. This set of assumptions describes settings where large amounts of customer opinions on a given topic are aggregated by a small number of popular websites (such as Amazon, Epinions, Citysearch, Yahoo, etc.) . Although these assumptions correspond nicely to the current reality in some types of markets, it would be interesting to consider to what extent the results might change in more decentralized environments where several, smaller forums (e.g. web logs, newsgroups) co-exist and different customers contribute to and access only a subset of them.
Appendix A: Proofs
Theorem 1 Lehmann's (1988) result can be stated as follows: Let x and y be scalar random variables drawn from information structures )
, where θ is an unknown scalar "state of nature" and F and G are probability distributions whose densities )
satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property in x and y respectively. Then, observing y is more effective than observing x with respect to any decision problem where the decision-makers' payoff function has single crossing incremental returns in θ if and only if:
has single crossing incremental returns in θ if, for any action
satisfies the single crossing property (crosses zero only once and from below as θ grows). Condition (A.1) can be equivalently written as requiring that the function: 
Conversely, x is more informative than y if:
In our setting, consumers observe pairs of ratings for firms A and B. Their decision problem is whether to purchase product A or B. Let as impose an arbitrary ordering on actions and assume that ) 
. Substituting into (A.2): 
. It is easy to see that the densities of F ′ , G′ satisfy the MLRP and thus Lehmann's result applies. Substituting into (A.2) we obtain
. Therefore, observing
To summarize, observing the vector ) , (
is more informative than observing the vector ) , (
Part 3 of the Theorem can be proven by applying the above procedure to compare the informativeness of information structures )) (
. It turns out that y′ is more informative than y if and only if
. The details are omitted.
The theorem is a simple corollary of the monotone comparative statics results of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) .
Theorem 3:
At the end of period 0 each firm maximizes the expected value of its profits in period 1:
First-order conditions result in a system of two linear equations on B A η η , . Solving these equations gives:
It follows that, if consumers believe that firms follow linear manipulation strategies hq g j ± = η , firms will indeed find it optimal to adopt such strategies 10 . Consistency of beliefs requires that the conjectured and optimal h are equal. From the above system of linear equations, this is equivalent to requiring that h is the solution of the equation:
This, in turn, is equivalent to the quadratic equation: . By Milgrom and Shannon (1994) this implies that the optimum j η declines with λ . Likewise, it is 0 ) 2 )( ( . By Milgrom and Shannon (1994) , this, in turn, implies that, if the size N of the market is sufficiently large, increases in the level of participation r decrease the firms' intensity of manipulation.
Finally, from (A.4), substituting , i.e. the precision of online ratings (without manipulation) is at least as high as that of the prior.
Theorem 6:
The precision of the forum signal is equal to , firms will indeed find it optimal to adopt such strategies. Notice that 0 4 / < − = µ h , which means that, for 0 > µ , the low quality firm manipulates more than the high quality firm, reducing the informativeness of the forum. For 0 = µ manipulation does not affect informativeness.
Theorem 9:
Since 4 / µ − = h is independent of λ and r , for 2 < µ : 
